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Abstract - Among non Exponential Discounting (ED) models, introduced to capture time 
inconsistent choices, Hyperbolic Discounting (HD) recently gained particular relevance. This paper 
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Since Strotz (1955) and Pollak (1968) a commonly shared view has 
prevailed (see, among others, Frederick-Loewenstein-O’Donoghue, 2002; 
Benhabib-Bisin-Schotter, 2004) suggesting that a decision maker exhibits time 
consistent choices if and only his discounting function is exponential. While, 
according to the accepted definition of time consistency (TC), it’s certainly 
true that exponential discounting (ED) entails TC, the issue as to whether TC 
implies ED does not seem to have been fully investigated. In a simple three 
period model, this note challenges the above shared view in showing that 
though the class of discounting functions that represent time consistent 
choices contains ED, it also includes non-ED models too. Among these we can 
find hyperbolic discounting (HD) Ainslie (1975-2002), one of the most 
successful non-ED models, originally proposed to describe dynamically 
inconsistent behaviour such as addiction and procrastination.   
Therefore, the main conclusion of the paper is that TC does not imply ED, 
namely non-ED models (such as HD) do not always imply time inconsistent 
choices.   
 
2 The Model  
 
  Consider a (discrete) three periods time horizon, t=0,1,2, and an 
individual having to choose between payoff x(1)>0, available at t=1, and 
x(2)>0 available at t=2.  
His discounting function is d(0)=1, 0≤ d(t)≤1 and he’s asked to indicate, 
first at t=0 and subsequently at t=1, whether he prefers x(1) at t=1 or x(2) at 
t=2. 
According to the accepted definition (Frederick-Loewenstein-O’Donoghue, 
2002), this amounts to testing the decision maker’s TC with respect to the two 
following payoff profiles,  
 
a=(x’(0)=0, x(1)>0, x’(2)=0); b=(x’(0)=0, x’(1)=0, x(2)>0) 
 
At t=0, he would prefer x(1) (x(2)), namely profile a (b),  if  
 
x(1) ≥ (<) [d(2)/d(1)]x(2)                             (1) 
 
and would still prefer x(1) (x(2)) at t=1 if  
 
x(1) ≥ (<) d(1)x(2)                                       (1a) 
 
With no meaningful loss of generality, we adopted the convention that in case 
(1) and (1a) hold as equalities then x(1)would be preferred.    2
When both (1) and (1a) are satisfied the individual is dynamically 
consistent, since his decision would be the same independently of the time at 
which it’s taken. To discuss TC it’s convenient to reformulate the two 
inequalities as follows, where x=[x(1)/x(2)]  
 
d(2) ≤ (>) xd(1)                             (2) 
 
d(1) ≤ (>) x                                  (2a) 
 
If  x≥1 then TC is the case for all pairs [0≤d(1)≤1,d(2)≤Min(1,d(1)x)]; 
consistency, however, can only concern x(1) but not x(2). Inconsistent choices 
realize when d(1) is low and d(2) is big enough, namely when they are 
sufficiently different, with d(2)>d(1). As x gets large, namely x(1) is much 
higher than x(2), choices tend to become dynamically consistent for almost all 
discounting functions. Notice however that if the condition d(1)≥d(2) is 
imposed, then any discounting function can represent time consistent 
preferences. In other terms, if payoffs are decreasing with time then no 
inconsistency can arise. Hence, study of TC is meaningful when x(1)<x(2), x<1, 
namely when the higher payoff is available later in time.    
If x<1 then TC realizes for all [d(1)≤x, d(2)≤d(1)x] or [d(1)>x, d(2)>d(1)x], 
namely as long as d(1) and d(2) are not too different. Moreover, quite 
intuitively, with x(1)<x(2) “high values” of the discount function entail 
consistent preferences for x(2) while “low  values” for x(1).  The following 
observation relates TC to ED.   
 
Fact  1  Exponential discounting satisfies inequalities (2) and (2a) and 
represents time consistent choices.     
 
Proof (i) Suppose x≥1; then it’s immediate to see that the function d(0)=1, 
0≤d(1)≤1 and d(2)=d(1)2 satisfies both (2) and (2a), again only in so far as x(1) is 
concerned. (ii) If x<1 then notice that within the domain [d(1)≤x, d(2)≤d(1)x] 
the function d(1)2 is bounded above by d(1)x while, over the domain [d(1)>x, 
d(2)>d(1)x] the function d(1)2 is bounded below by d(1)x, and the conclusion 
follows.  
 
Therefore, with both x<1 and x≥1 we have that TC is represented by ED, 
namely  d(2)=d(1)2; however, (2) and (2a) can be satisfied also by other   
discounting functions. The following section shows that HD is included in 
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3 Time Consistency with Hyperbolic Discounting  
 
 
We now discuss conditions under which HD could represent 
dynamically consistent choices. 
 
Fact 2 Let x<(1/2) or x≥(2/3) and suppose d(t)=1/(1+t), with t=0,1,2. Then 
d(t) can satisfy inequalities (2) and (2a) and represent time consistent choices. 
 
Proof   (i) Assume x≥1; then since d(0)=1,  d(1)=(1/2)  and  d(2)=(1/3), 
namely decreasing with time, it’s easy to see that (2) and (2a) are satisfied, 
again only in so far as x(1) is concerned. (ii) Suppose now x<1; then, for all 
x≥(2/3) inequalities (2) and (2a) are satisfied for consistent choices of x(1). 
Analogously, for all x<(1/2) inequalities (2) and (2a) are satisfied for consistent 
choices concerning x(2), and the result is proved.  
  
Summarising, the above observation says that if x(1)<x(2) then HD can 
represent time consistent choices when the two payoffs are either close to 
each other or else quite different. This suggests that the most common 
interpretation of HD, as a model formalizing inconsistent choices, is correct 
but only for some payoff structures. As a matter of fact, in the simple context 
we worked with, the measure of the relevant parameter space (x<1) entailing 
TC (5/6) is significantly larger than the one implying inconsistency (1/6).   
 
Fact 2 could be further generalized by showing that, indeed, any non-
ED model could represent TC preferences.  
 
Proposition 1 For any d(0)=1, 0<d(1)≤d(2)≤1 there exist x<1 such that the 
discounting function represents TC preferences.  
 
Proof It’s easy to see that any x≥ Max[d(1), d(2)/d(1)] will induce 
consistent choices of x(1) while any  x<Min[d(1), d(2)/d(1)] of x(2), and the 
conclusion follows.    
 
For a better appreciation and understanding of Fact 2 it’s convenient to 
consider now extending the model to T>2 periods.  Let now t=0,1,2,..,T and 
suppose the individual has to choose between payoffs x(T-1)>0 and x(T)>0, 
available respectively at t=T-1 and t=T.  
The individual is first asked to choose at t=0, then at t=1 etc. until t=T-1. The 
following result, the easy proof of which we are going to skip, establishes 
more general conditions for discounting functions representing TC.  
 
Proposition 2  Define  x=x(T)/x(T-1) and suppose  x<Min[d(t)/d(t-1)] or 
x≥Max[d(t)/d(t-1)]; then d(t) represents time consistent preferences. If d(t)/d(t-1)is 
increasing with t, as in the case of d(t)=1/(1+t), then the bounds become x<d(1)=(1/2) 
and  x≥ d(T)/d(T-1)=1-(1/T).      4
        
The proposition generalizes Fact 2, establishing that TC occurs when 
the two payoff values are either similar, in which case the earlier one will be 
consistently preferred, or else the later payoff is sufficiently larger than the 
earlier one and chosen at each time.  This of curse clarifies that the only model 
guaranteeing TC for all x<1 is ED.  
The result appears to suggest TC to depend upon:  
(i)  similarity-diversity of payoff available in time 
(ii)  length of time horizon. 
In particular, in so far as HD is concerned the longer the time horizon, 
the more similar payoffs have to be for x(T-1) to be consistently chosen, and as 
T gets large the two payoffs will basically have to be the same. Preferences for 
x(T) however, do not depend upon T, and always concern payoffs such that 
x(2) is at least twice as large as x(1).  
 
 
4 Conclusions  
 
 
The main conclusion of the paper is that non exponential discounting 
functions do not necessarily represent dynamically inconsistent choices. In a 
simple three period horizon model we have shown that hyperbolic 
discounting, as well as exponential discounting, can formalize consistent 
preferences. In the more interesting case, where the two relevant payoffs 
increase with time, this can occur when they either do not differ much or else 
they are quite different. Therefore, hyperbolic discounting can be 
conveniently used to formalize dynamically inconsistent choices only for 
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